Is Diaspora Defeatist?

Sun Tzu said:

“A kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can the dead ever be brought back to life” (Ch XII).

In a world which we have long since lost, the kingdom encompassed a nation (or nations) in the most primordial sense of kindred people(s) under the same prince. This kingdom possessed a warrior aristocracy, a spiritual elite, and of course the person of the sovereign, all providing the order of civilization to the mass of their subjects and securing them as a protected patrimony against other such kingdoms and against the baseness of their own nature.

Using more modern English to translate Sun Tzu, we might say that “a nation-state which has been destroyed can never come again into being.” In the vernacular, owing to how nation-states were so ubiquitous, we do not even distinguish a nation from its state, nor a government from its people. If we are to have a serious understanding of identity and politics, however, we can certainly disaggregate the two, and in fact we must in order to respond to the unique problem of the Western nation-state’s decline and fall. Now, there are some exceptions to the rule that vanquished nation-states are gone permanently, but they require that the nation of said nation-state meet most of these points:

  • Have a long history and memories of glory or a golden age for national mythmaking
  • Be under a direct, foreign, and burdensome occupation
  • Be consistently and blatantly reminded of that outside presence so as to make the ordinary man feel injured (or primed to feel injured) by it
  • Retain or recreate an elite with a national consciousness who are capable of directing and cultivating resistance such that they can assert power over the state when the occupation is ended
  • Suffer minimal demographic damage to its ethnic composition within its claimed territorial range

A good example of nation-state or “kingdom” which was “destroyed” and reappeared is Poland. Poland today is much smaller than old Poland, but is also much more homogeneous, and more Polish as a percentage than it has ever been. Most importantly, the Polish nation-state is governed by Polish nationalists who do not view the Polishness of Poland as inconsequential. This is very different from the situation in, say, Ireland, which recently elected the homosexual Indian Leo Varadkar its prime minister. Ironically perhaps to outsiders, this was hardly an upset in the country—which once violently resisted rule by British Protestants and now doesn’t care about having foreign non-Catholics as governors. The outgoing prime minister, Enda Kenny, celebrated their newfound cosmopolitanism:

“As the country’s youngest holder of this office, he speaks for a new generation of Irish women and Irish men, he represents a modern, diverse and inclusive Ireland and speaks for them like no other.”

Compare this with the attitude of Poland’s prime minister, Beata Szydło, towards diversity and inclusion:

“Poland cannot accept refugees.”

Both Poland and Ireland are over 90% European, though only the former will attempt to maintain those numbers.

Other nations which have had less success at restoring their territorial nation-states but nevertheless still meet enough criteria are Serbia, Hungary, Armenia, Ukraine, and other small countries in Eastern and Central Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union, her satellites, and Yugoslavia in the 1990s indeed “restored” a number of nation-states to the map, just as the collapse of European colonial empires earlier in the century created new nation-states.

But in Western Europe, the Americas, and British Oceania, the kingdom has been destroyed in a much different context, and one far more damaging. Our nation-states were not destroyed by force of arms such that the government was replaced by the satraps of an occupying imperial power. Rather, they atrophied and rotted from the inside. No enemy hordes stormed the ramparts of the Atlanticist world and no one died defending their lands. Yet the result might as well be the same: a demoralized, deracinated populace with low fertility, governed by people who at best have a mild dislike for them and at worst believe they should die out for the good of égalité or the economy. And of course, there is the large presence of foreign internal colonies which multiply endlessly and transform our demographics and politics.

A number of these states are the metropolises of former empires, such as Britain and France. These are not merely nation-states under occupation, but nations which have become de-nationalized into practicing a liberal cosmopolitanist non-identity. They dismantled their empires, and now they dismantle themselves.

Some readers have expressed their criticism of this perspective and argued that forming a diaspora and “giving up” on nationalism is defeatist, or that it is necessary but insufficient. And if we were truly one mass movement or civil war away from “taking back our country” or implementing 20th century interwar fascism or repatriating millions of multigenerational foreigners, I would have to agree. But I don’t think we are.

The Fifth Political Theory (5PT) is only “defeatist” or “blackpilled” in the sense that it:

  1. Recognizes the de-nationalized reality of the Western diaspora
  2. Believes a simple reversal of the situation is impossible within a timeframe that has any meaning for anyone alive, if it is at all possible
  3. Views the demo-bureaucratic state as a deeply degraded form of socio-political organization that cannot produce the desired outcome

For those interested in the perpetuity of European and Eurocolonial people and our flourishing, nationalism seems to be an easy enough answer. If you have your own state then you have your own territory which outsiders can be excluded from by fiat, and the ability to enforce domestic and foreign policy. Those are useful things to have, if you can get them. But Europeans and Eurocolonials outside of Eastern Europe do not have nation-states. They live in increasingly non-European demo-bureaucracies managed by cosmopolitans who view the European and Eurocolonial ethnos as a retrograde or evil identity. And these elites are not about to lose power to ethno-nationalist parties, nor would they ever cede power to them without a fight. Such parties also hardly exist and their partisans are in no position to fight for them and win, because they form a minuscule minority whose own kin would turn on them for being “racist.” As has been stated before, this assessment of Western nationalism(s) is grim. This is not a happy picture. This is not something ethnocentric Europeans or Eurocolonials want. But this is reality.

The state does not represent Europeans or Eurocolonials. We are extremely limited in our ability to politically capture and redirect the demo-bureaucracy to serve our interests. We need to build networks, institutions, and communities outside of it.

Does changing our methods mean defeat? Sun Tzu also said:

“Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances…

Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.

Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions” (VI).

The 5PT perspective of diaspora tribalism is not anti-nationalist but rather non-nationalist. It is only “defeatist” to someone thinking at a national level rather than one which is sub-national and trans-national. Because 5PT holds that the 19th and 20th century conception of the European or Eurocolonial nation-state has been defeated conceptually, morally, and emotionally, the solution is not as simple as a mere reversal of the status quo. Our circumstances do not allow for this. Ethno-nationalists must realize they have lost on some level, or they wouldn’t frame their arguments in dire terms like “white genocide” and express the need for the state to aggressively enforce ethnocentric policies on people who don’t practice ethnocentrism.

But dire warnings are nothing new. And more often than not, corrective measures aren’t taken against the kali yuga. Because if they were, we wouldn’t call it a dark age.

The American white supremacist Lothrop Stoddard, whose most influential work The Rising Tide of Color was written after the First World War, had a prescient view of what would become of European and Eurocolonial civilization. White supremacy as a particular global caste structure historically proved unsustainable, and Stoddard shows how Europeans were both its creators and destroyers. (Let us observe the divine implications of creation and destruction united in one agent, but leave such a discussion for elsewhere). Stoddard’s description of “a world politically nine-tenths white” existing in contrast to “a world of which only four-tenths at most can be considered predominately white” foreshadows an imperial collapse all too clear to readers in our day, though in his it was counter-intuitive (Ch I). This framing, which separates political control from territorial settlement, also accounts for the geopolitical split between Europeans and Eurocolonials, with the latter living as an increasingly beleaguered minority upon whose security that of the former rested:

“The basic fact remains that some four-fifths of the entire white race is concentrated on less than one-fifth of the white world’s territorial area (Europe), while the remaining one-fifth of the race… scattered to the ends of the earth, must protect four-fifths of the white territorial heritage against the pressure of colored races eleven times its numerical strength” (Ch I).

From Stoddard’s perspective, one critical defense of European- or Eurocolonial-majority territories against being overtaken by the numerically superior and more fertile non-Europeans was the projection of pan-European power. Such projection made up for how thinly spread Europe was as a civilization, but was profoundly shaken by the fratricide of the First Wold War:

“Then came the Great War. The colored world suddenly saw the white peoples which, in racial matters had hitherto maintained something of a united front, locked in an intercine death-grapple of unparalleled ferocity; it saw white race-unity cleft by political and moral gulfs which white men themselves continuously iterated would never be filled. As colored men realized the significance of it all, they looked into each other’s eyes and there saw the light of undreamed-of hopes. The white world was tearing itself to pieces. White solidarity was riven and shattered. And–fear of white power and respect for white civilization together dropped away like garments outworn” (Ch I).

The other critical defense consisted of the “outer and inner dikes.” The outer dikes were “regions of white political control” worth defending on only a strategic level, while the inner dikes were “the areas of white settlement” which “should be defended to the last extremity no matter if the costs involved are greater than their mere economic value would warrant” (Ch X). Stoddard saw that the outer dikes in Asia and Africa (as well as Latin America) were not going to last and expressed concern that “neither a Pan-Colored nor a Colored-Bolshevist alliance are impossibilities, far-fetched though these terms may be” (Ch X). These prophesied geopolitical alliances actually came to pass during the Cold War, and their direct influence on the collective ego of Europeans and Eurocolonials in their own homelands could be felt then and now as liberal cosmopolitan morality triumphed over European ethnocentrism. What we know as decolonization, Stoddard would have understood as yielding the outer dikes.

Regarding the inner dikes, Stoddard describes how immigration, whether “kindred” or “colored” poses a threat, but argues that the latter threatens “incalculably greater damage which would be wrought by the coming of persons wholly alien in blood and possessed of idealistic and cultural backgrounds absolutely different from ours” (Ch XI). These inner dikes are maintained only by European will, because the incentives to breach them on the part of non-Europeans are so great. Stoddard adds:

“Their standards of living are so inconceivably low, their congestion is so painful, and their consequent desire for relief so keen that the high-standard, relatively empty white world seems to them a perfect paradise. Only the white man’s veto has prevented a perfect deluge of colored men into white lands” (Ch XI).

America’s “immigration debate” and the European “migrant crisis” are really nihil sub sole novum. The veto Stoddard speaks of has been gone for decades, because like colonialism before it, it was deemed “racist” and a sin against the equality of humanity to because it excluded.

Renunciation of the veto protecting the inner dikes, which Stoddard warned about almost one hundred years ago, has only led to greater demographic erosion. In all major European and Eurocolonial countries west of the Slavic lands we find growing non-European populations and declining native ones. Stoddard projects that:

“If the white race should to-day surrender enough of its frontiers to ease the existing colored population-pressure, so quickly would these surrendered regions be swamped, and so rapidly would the fast-breeding colored races fill the homeland gaps, that in a very short time the diminished white world would be faced with an even louder colored clamor for admittance–backed by an increased power to enforce the colored will” (Ch XI).

California, London, Paris, and other places affirm that this has come to pass. In Europe, where demographic decline is presently less advanced than in the United States, it is not entirely legal to critique immigration on identity-based grounds. In the United States, it is legal but frowned upon, increasingly frowned upon as non-European immigrants and their descendants form a greater part of the electorate and liberal cosmopolitans dominate political discourse. Power has been lost.

What is it that 5PT hopes to take away from all of this dated literature on white supremacist geopolitics? It is simple: white supremacist geopolitics has been destroyed so thoroughly that we should not view an assessment of it as being destroyed as pessimism. It is a fact, and if facts inspire us to do nothing differently, then we are an unresponsive organism which deserves extinction. Anyone seriously interested in the future of Europeans and Eurocolonials will thus accomplish very little by responding to the destruction of white supremacy by asking for it to be brought back. Similar can be observed of ethno-nationalism, which seeks to preserve the inner dikes. But those have been long breached. Consider the Sisyphean task of building a border wall between the United States and Latin America when the United States is nearly a fifth Hispanic and counting.

A further observation we can draw using Stoddard’s paradigm of dikes is that while “areas of white settlement” may still exist, they are no longer congruent with “regions of white political control.” In the age of European imperialism, such inconsistencies seldom occurred, as white-majority areas were governed by nationalists or imperialists. In the age of liberal cosmopolitanism, such inconsistencies are the norm, as white-majority areas are governed without regard for their preservation.

Is it defeatist to say we cannot go backwards in time to the 19th and 20th centuries? If nationalism of the non-civic variety has been defeated along with the empires that protected it, why chase after the setting Sun? Why should we be attached to this particular form of modernity? If not even the transformation of a demo-bureaucratic state into a demo-bureaucratic state with an ethnic reference is permissible, how are the even more extreme varieties of nationalism which some defenders of the European stock argue for plausible?

Another quote from Stoddard is instructive:

“The white man, like King Canute, seats himself upon the tidal sands and bids the waves be stayed. He will be lucky if he escapes merely with wet shoes” (Ch X).

It is this sort of thinking which 5PT seeks to transcend entirely, so as to not be trapped in futile, defeated paradigms. If nationalism relies on mass (re-)conversion of the demos in a given state, what is to be done if that threshold is never crossed? The zen of detachment provides a greater clarity than what for many is a kneejerk-reactionary mindset. The esoteric nature of the “blackpill” is not demoralization but the sharpening of one’s mind to achieve awakening.

Building powerful and influential ethnic networks, institutions, and communities that cross borders and keep our people, or the best of our people who possess the will to perpetuate, united—that is something which will have a lasting impact on our diasporic future more than championing any particular state ideology. That is not defeatist. That is knowing ourselves, knowing our adversaries, and knowing our circumstances. 

The world our people once had has been killed. Most of us have never even known that world outside of textbooks. We are strangers in a strange land. We are a diaspora, and we need to act like it.

Titus Quintus

June 30, 2017

Works Cited:

Stoddard, Lothrop. The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy. 1920. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated by Lionel Giles.


9 thoughts on “Is Diaspora Defeatist?

  1. I think I’ve been unconsciously stumbling towards 5th Political Theory on my own haphazard and less thought-through projectory for a quite a while. So this is timely and refreshing stuff. I look forward to more of your writing.


  2. ““blackpill” is not demoralization but the sharpening of one’s mind to achieve awakening.”

    Fascinating; I believe this theory is the best explanation for the situation we are really in, whatever the theory’s flaws could be. This is the “realpolitik”.

    What do you think of the thread about this theory on the right stuff forum? I believe many alt-right types are in bubbles of those like them, of the same age, and such, and are unaware of how ‘modernized’ the (pre-1965 origin) population is. I believe a Richard Spencer could not win so much as a local election even in an entirely non-diverse district.


    1. This is to be expected. A lot of people have become very invested emotionally and metapolitically in the idea of the “ethnostate.” I think the future will be much more complicated than trying to emulate the 19th and 20th centuries’ nation-states, which were largely made possible because of European imperialism, a condition which no longer exists. Planning to write an extensive critique of ethno-nationalism at some point.

      Richard Spencer could have perhaps performed better than David Duke in 1990s Louisiana but in 2010s Montana not so.


  3. I believe European Culture will survive in Eastern Europe and Russia. Putin had offered land out in Eastern Russia to dissatisfied Brits. I’d like to see him open this offer up to all people of European descent who want to flee their current countries likd the white South Africans.


  4. Thx for the great articles.
    RE: Your (accurate, in my view) assertion that Christianity is more than partly to blame for the dissolution of the West, do you believe it will/could play a role in the proposed diaspora? Seems like religion is pretty darn important and/or foundational, and I don’t see an alternative for us at the moment.
    (I speak as a Catholic, experiencing profound confusion, dedicated and attached as I am both to the Church, and to my civilization/people generally.)


    1. If Europeans and Eurocolonials still practice Christianity in the future it will be different from the varieties we are familiar with today, by necessity. Most forms of contemporary Western Christianity are far too xenophilic and culturally passive to become a tribal faith.

      One sign we may go in a different direction is that many of the ethno-nationalist movements and thinkers (who form the basis for the diaspora rather than actual politically viable parties in my opinion) tend towards Nietzschean criticisms of Christianity, and/or neo-paganism and to a lesser extent eastern philosophies. Also a sizable amount of people are interested in Russian Orthodoxy, which while Christian has no communal roots among Westerners, and so could be considered among the possible and possibly syncretic options for a future diaspora religion.

      Certainly Methodists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, or Catholics will not defend the Western diaspora, to say the least.


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